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Christopher R. Deubert* 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article analyzes the application of federal regulations governing 
human subjects research to the National Football League (NFL). More 
specifically, this Article examines research conducted via the NFL 
Scouting Combine. The NFL Combine is an annual event in which 
approximately 300 of the best college football players undergo medical 
examinations, intelligence tests, interviews, and multiple football and 
other athletic drills in the hopes of demonstrating their prowess and 
landing a spot in the NFL. Combine participants are under intense pressure 
to impress NFL clubs. Indeed, the Combine is routinely called the “biggest 
job interview of their lives.” 
 
*Thank you to I. Glenn Cohen, Professor, Harvard Law School, and Faculty Director, 
Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology & Bioethics at Harvard Law 
School, and Holly Fernandez Lynch, John Russell Dickson, MD Presidential Assistant 
Professor of Medical Ethics, Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy at the 
University of Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine, for helpful comments and 
introducing me to the world of human subjects research regulation.  All errors are my own. 
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The examinations, tests and drills provide a plethora of data for NFL 
clubs to analyze in considering which players to select in the NFL Draft. 
NFL club medical personnel scour the data on behalf of the clubs, looking 
for medical conditions that might affect a player’s short-term or long-term 
usefulness to the club. Many of these medical personnel have then also 
published studies utilizing the medical data from the NFL Combine. Such 
studies can provide a better understanding of the medical conditions faced 
by elite football players. At the same time, these studies help clubs predict 
how a Combine participant’s medical condition or history might affect his 
performance on an NFL field. 
Against this backdrop is the field of human subjects research 
regulation. Born out of some horrific historical incidents, bioethicists, 
doctors, lawyers and related experts constructed a paradigm setting forth 
the requirements for research—particularly medical research—involving 
humans as subjects. Included in this paradigm are federal regulations, 
known as the “Common Rule,” which typically require that research be 
reviewed and approved by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) and that 
the researchers obtain the participants’ informed consent before 
proceeding. Moreover, the Common Rule requires that additional 
protections be implemented where the population being researched is 
considered “vulnerable.” 
This Article examines whether 42 medical studies published using 
the medical records and data of NFL Combine participants comply with 
the Common Rule and other human subjects research guidelines. Given 
the intense pressure to please NFL clubs, and the precariousness of a career 
in the NFL, NFL Combine participants have significantly constrained 
choices about whether to participate in the research being conducted. 
Consequently, it is highly questionable whether informed consent—as 
required by the spirit and letter of the Common Rule—is being obtained. 
Additionally, given most players’ limited financial resources and the 
inequitable power relationship between players and NFL clubs, there is a 
strong argument that NFL Combine participants should be considered a 
vulnerable research population. This argument is bolstered by similarities 
between the workplaces of NFL players and military personnel—a 
population regularly recognized as vulnerable. 
The Article concludes with five recommendations for better 
protecting NFL Combine participants in the context of human subjects 
research: (1) requiring researchers and/or the Combine participants to read 
the consent form aloud and audio record the process; (2) requiring all 
research to be approved by the National Football League Players 
Association; (3) requiring consent forms to be provided to the Combine 
participants’ agents; (4) having IRBs engage the perspective of a player 
when evaluating research; and (5) requiring that Combine participants’ 
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decision whether or not to participate in the research remain confidential. 
By requiring such protections, IRBs have the potential to ensure that NFL 
Combine participants are being subjected to research in the dignified and 
respectful matter required by the Common Rule. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Research involving the National Football League (NFL) attracts 
public attention, elite universities and professionals, and tens of millions 
of dollars. For example, in 2016, the NFL committed $100 million to 
research concerning head injuries.1 Similarly, in 2014, the National 
Football League Players Association (NFLPA), the players’ union, 
committed $56 million to Harvard University for a variety of research 
projects related to NFL player health.2 
Not surprisingly, the interest in NFL-related research has extended to 
players not yet in the NFL. More specifically, there is a considerable—and 
growing—body of research utilizing data from the NFL Scouting 
Combine, an annual event each February in which approximately three 
hundred of the best college football players undergo medical 
examinations, intelligence tests, interviews and multiple football and other 
athletic drills and tests in the hopes of demonstrating their prowess and 
being selected in the NFL Draft.3 Between 2004 and June 2018, there have 
been 42 published medical studies utilizing data from the NFL Combine, 
17 of which were published in just 2017 and 2018. 
These studies—which are listed in Appendix A—analyze a wide 
range of medical issues that might affect NFL players, such as anterior 
cruciate ligament reconstruction, hip surgery, knee injuries, labral tears, 
and spine conditions. Notably, only one of the studies concerns 
concussions. The studies are principally concerned with either or both of 
two questions: (1) the prevalence of a condition in Combine attendees; and 
(2) the effect of such a condition on the player’s performance in the NFL. 
Thus, while at least some of this research is designed to improve the 
diagnosis and treatment of conditions commonly faced by NFL players, a 
substantial portion of the research is clearly designed to better help NFL 
clubs evaluate the physical health and injury risks of Draft prospects. This 
is not surprising considering that all but one of the studies were co-
authored by medical personnel affiliated with NFL clubs. 
Nevertheless, medical research is generally highly-regulated. 
Research with human participants that is federally funded or which occurs 
at an institution that receives federal funds, with some exceptions, “is 
 
 1. Ken Belson, N.F.L. to Spend $100 Million to Address Head Trauma, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2gddYAP. 
 2. See The Football Players Health Study at Harvard University, FAQs, 
https://perma.cc/D9HG-KECK (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) (answering the question of how 
the Football Players Health Study at Harvard University was funded). From May 2014 to 
May 2017, the author was a part of the Law & Ethics Initiative of the Football Players 
Health Study at Harvard University. 
 3. NFL Scouting Combine, NATIONAL FOOTBALL SCOUTING, http://perma.cc/7ZSS-
YBSP (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
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governed by a set of rules and procedures designed to protect study 
participants while enabling the advancement of important biomedical and 
social science research.”4 These federal “regulations are formally known 
as the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects and are often 
referred to as the ‘Common Rule’ because they are held in common by 
many different federal agencies and departments.”5 Since its promulgation 
in 1991 and through its amendment in 2017, the Common Rule has stood 
as the backbone for ethical research involving human subjects. 
This Article raises questions about whether the medical research 
coming out of the Combine complies with the Common Rule. In particular, 
given the backgrounds of many NFL Combine participants (also referred 
to herein simply as “players”) and the pressure to make the NFL, it is 
questionable whether NFL Combine participants are providing the type of 
meaningful informed consent required by the Common Rule. The authors 
of these studies universally declined to provide further information about 
the studies, preventing a definitive answer. Consequently, this Article 
merely seeks to shed light on this important question, and to suggest 
meaningful ways in which researchers—and the institutional regulators 
overseeing them—can better ensure that NFL Combine participants are 
protected. 
 
*** 
 
This Article will proceed in 4 Parts: Part I provides background on 
human subjects research regulation and the Common Rule; Part II 
provides background on the NFL Combine; Part III examines the 
application of the Common Rule to the medical research performed with 
NFL Combine data; and, Part IV provides recommendations for better 
protecting NFL Combine participants when they become human subjects 
research participants. Finally, I conclude with thoughts on the importance 
of increased scrutiny to this issue for the purposes of better protecting 
future NFL players. 
II. HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH REGULATION 
The existing rules and regulations governing human subjects research 
in the United States grew out of a series of historical incidents in which 
humans were used in research in disturbing and unethical ways. This Part 
will provide the historical background on some of those incidents, the 
resulting evolution of bioethical consideration of these issues, the 
 
 4. Barbara E. Bierer et al., Revised ‘Common Rule’ Shapes Protections For Research 
Participants, 36 HEALTH AFFAIRS 784, 784 (2017). 
 5. Id. 
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subsequent enactment of the Common Rule, and the requirements of the 
Common Rule today. 
A. Historical Background 
There are two particularly important incidents in the history of human 
subjects research. 
First, during World War II, Nazi doctors and scientists subjected 
thousands of prisoners to “painful and often deadly experiments . . . 
without their consent.”6 Following the war, 16 Nazi doctors and personnel 
were convicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity as part of the 
Nuremberg Trials.7 In handing down the convictions, the judges laid out 
ten principles that ought to govern medical experiments.8 The first 
principle of the list, which came to be known as the Nuremberg Code, 
declared that “[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely 
essential.”9 
Second, between 1932 and 1972, the United States Public Health 
Service tracked the health of 399 black men from rural southern 
communities who had contracted syphilis.10 However, the doctors 
involved with the study (known as the “Tuskegee Study”) did not advise 
the men they had the disease, did not treat the disease and discouraged 
other doctors from treating the men.11 The study was stopped when its 
details were publicly reported and became the subject of widespread 
condemnation.12 The United States government later agreed to create a $10 
million fund to cover the medical benefits and burial services of all living 
research participants, and President Bill Clinton formally apologized for 
the study in 1997.13 
In 1974, Congress passed the National Research Act which, among 
other things, created the National Commission for the Protection of 
 
 6. Nazi Medical Experiments, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, 
https://perma.cc/M5RH-Q64M (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 7. Alexander Morgan Capron, Subjects, Participants, and Partners: What Are the 
Implications for Research as the Role of Informed Consent Evolves?, in HUMAN SUBJECTS 
RESEARCH REGULATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE 143, 143–44 (I. Glenn Cohen & 
Holly Fernandez Lynch eds., 2014). 
 8. Id. at 144. 
 9. Id. (citing THE NUREMBURG CODE (1947), in Timeline of Laws Related to the 
Protection of Human Subjects, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Joel Sparks ed., 2002), 
https://history.nih.gov/about/timelines/nuremberg.html). As will be discussed below, 
modern research ethics recognizes a variety of circumstances in which consent is not 
required or can be waived. 
 10. U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://perma.cc/UE4K-EKS2 (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.14 The 
Commission was charged with identifying “the basic ethical principles 
that should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral research 
involving human subjects and to develop guidelines which should be 
followed to assure that such research is conducted in accordance with 
those principles.”15 In 1979, the Commission released a lengthy report, 
entitled “Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human 
Subjects Research,” which came to be known as the Belmont Report.16 
The Belmont Report, which specifically referenced the Nazi and 
Tuskegee studies, “identified respect for persons, beneficence, and justice 
as three basic ethical principles that should underlie the conduct of 
biomedical and behavioral research involving human subjects in the 
United States.”17 The Belmont Report also explained how these principles 
should be applied in research practice by (1) obtaining informed consent, 
(2) minimizing risks and ensuring a generally favorable risk-benefit ratio, 
and (3) selecting subjects fairly.18 The Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare (now known as the Department of Health and Human 
Services) subsequently revised its regulations concerning human research 
to incorporate the conclusions of the Belmont Report.19 
B. Background on the Common Rule 
The Belmont Report’s influence did not end with the Department of 
Health and Human Services. In 1991, fourteen additional federal agencies 
and departments adopted the same basic regulations “in an effort to 
develop uniform and consistent policies for human subjects research 
across federal funding bodies.”20 These regulations thus became known as 
the “Common Rule.”21 “Today, the Common Rule governs research 
conducted or supported by the [sixteen] federal departments and agencies 
that have adopted it.”22 
 
 14. The Belmont Report, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS. (Apr. 19, 1979), 
https://perma.cc/8HYF-3KZX [hereinafter The Belmont Report]. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Amy L. Davis & Elisa A. Hurley, Setting the Stage: The Past and Present of 
Human Subjects Research Regulations, in HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH REGULATION: 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE 9, 10–11 (I. Glenn Cohen & Holly Fernandez Lynch eds., 
2014). 
 18. Id. at 11. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.; Revised Common Rule, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., 
https://perma.cc/24WF-PWYB (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
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After a multi-year process, the Common Rule was amended in 
2017,23 with those amendments becoming effective in 2018. According to 
experts, the amendments were needed to correct “gaps in protections, on 
the one hand, and gross inefficiencies and overregulation, on the other.”24 
Modern research involving biospecimens was at least one of the driving 
forces behind the amendments,25 and is generally not relevant to the 
analysis here. 
All of the research examined in this Article was conducted pursuant 
to the former version of the Common Rule. Nevertheless, in this Article, 
the text from the revised version is generally provided so that the Article 
is useful moving forward. Additionally, the majority of the changes to the 
relevant provisions were cosmetic and did not fundamentally alter their 
purpose or effect. Where meaningful revisions have been made, both the 
former and revised versions of the Common Rule’s requirements are 
provided. 
Some clarifications and definitions also provide important context. 
The Common Rule only applies to “research involving human subjects.”26 
A “human subject” is defined as “a living individual about whom an 
investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research: (i) 
Obtains information or biospecimens through intervention or interaction 
with the individual, and uses, studies, or analyzes the information or 
biospecimens; or (ii) Obtains, uses, studies, analyzes or generates 
identifiable private information or identifiable biospecimens.”27 
Additionally, research under the Common Rule is broadly defined as “a 
systematic investigation, including research development, testing and 
evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge.”28 
Importantly, not all research is the same. A considerable portion of 
medical research is obviously devoted to understanding and treating (if not 
curing) the world’s most serious diseases, illnesses, and injuries. Of 
course, when human subjects are used in such research, they may be 
exposed to serious health risks as a result of experimental treatments. 
Nevertheless, there is a great deal of research involving human subjects 
that is much more benign. The Common Rule defines such research as 
“minimal risk,” meaning “that the probability and magnitude of harm or 
discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves 
than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance 
 
 23. 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46). 
 24. Bierer et al., supra note 4, at 784. 
 25. See id. at 785. 
 26. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (West 2018). 
 27. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e)(1) (West 2018). 
 28. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(l). 
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of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.”29 Most (if not 
all) of the research discussed in this article is likely minimal risk, an 
important contextual factor. 
Additionally, there are exemptions to the Common Rule,30 including 
for “secondary research.”31 Secondary research in the medical field is 
research using “existing health data,”32 i.e.¸ data that was not collected for 
purposes of the present research. Secondary research data often comes 
from existing medical records or samples or data from previous research 
studies. Secondary research relevant to this Article consists of one of two 
types: (1) research using “publicly available” “identifiable private 
information,”33 or (2) research using information that “is recorded by the 
investigator in such a manner that the identity of the human subjects 
cannot readily be ascertained directly or through identifiers linked to the 
subjects, the investigator does not contact the subjects, and the investigator 
will not re-identify subjects.”34 As is discussed in Section III.C, this 
exemption potentially applies to some of the research involving NFL 
Combine participants. 
Finally, the Common Rule does not apply to all human subjects 
research conducted in the United States. The Common Rule only applies 
to research “conducted” or “supported” by the federal departments that 
have adopted the Common Rule.35 According to the Office for Human 
Research Protections (OHRP), a division of the Department of Health and 
Human Services responsible for overseeing human subjects research,36 
“federally-supported means the U.S. Government providing any funding 
or other support.”37 As part of obtaining federal research funding, 
 
 29. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(j). 
 30. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.104 (West 2018) (listing exemptions to the Common Rule). 
 31. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4).  
 32. Barbara J. Evans, Why the Common Rule is Hard to Amend, 10 Ind. Health L. Rev. 
365, 378 (2013). 
 33. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(i). 
 34. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(ii). The former version of the Common Rule lumped 
these exemptions together in a more muddled fashion, defining exempt secondary research 
as “[r]esearch . . . involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records, 
pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if these sources are publicly available or 
if the information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects cannot be 
identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) 
(2005) (amended 2018). 
 35. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (West 2018). 
 36. About OHRP, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., https://perma.cc/7NYM-
TPYF (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 37. Federalwide Assurance (FWA) for the Protection of Human Subjects, OFFICE FOR 
HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., https://perma.cc/F6PL-VYPZ (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
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institutions obtain what is known as a Federalwide Assurance (FWA), 
indicating their agreement to comply with the Common Rule.38 
While colleges and universities often receive federal funding for 
research projects, many research projects are funded internally or by 
private donors.39 This distinction creates the possibility that at a particular 
university, some of its research will be subject to the Common Rule and 
some will not. In order to avoid problems that might arise from having 
inconsistent research policies, approximately two-thirds of American 
colleges and universities voluntarily agree that all of its non-exempt 
human subjects research will comply with the Common Rule.40 This 
practice has been known as “checking the box.”41 Historically, in checking 
the box, the university was subjecting all of its research—federally and 
privately funded—to OHRP’s jurisdiction. However, under the revised 
Common Rule, while institutions can still voluntarily apply the Common 
Rule to all of their research, OHRP will no longer have jurisdiction over 
research that is not federally funded.42 
With this background, we can now review the specific requirements 
of the Common Rule. 
C. Requirements of the Common Rule 
The Common Rule’s principal requirements govern: (1) the 
constitution and operations of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs); and, 
(2) obtaining informed consent from research participants. Each 
requirement is discussed in turn. 
 
 38. Id.; see also Assurance Process Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), OFFICE FOR 
HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., https://perma.cc/E9J6-LUQF (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) 
(answering the question of “What is a Federalwide Assurance (FWA)?,” the OHRP states 
that, “[u]nder an FWA, an institution commits to HHS that it will comply with the 
requirements set forth in 45 CFR part 46, as well as the Terms of Assurance.”).  
 39. See Jeffrey Mervis, Data check: U.S. government share of basic research funding 
falls below 50%, SCIENCE (Mar. 9, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://perma.cc/P84F-8XDH 
(discussing sources of research funding); see also Art Jahnke, Who Picks Up the Tab for 
Science?, BU TODAY (Apr. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/FR3V-U6W7. 
 40. See Harold Blatt et al., When the Assurance comes a ‘Knocking’: OHRP’s FWA 
and IRB Registration Processes, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS. (Mar. 28, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/5FE2-R248. 
 41. See id. 
 42. E-mail from Jaime O. Hernandez, Public Health Advisor, Office for Human 
Research Protections, to author (July 20, 2018) (on file with author). 
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1. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) 
An IRB is “a group whose function is to review research to assure the 
protection of the rights and welfare of the human subjects.”43 IRBs “review 
and have authority to approve, require modifications in (to secure 
approval), or disapprove all research activities covered by [the Common 
Rule].”44 
In order for research to be approved under the Common Rule, the 
IRB must find that all of the following requirements are satisfied: 
(1) Risks to subjects are minimized: (i) By using procedures 
which are consistent with sound research design and which 
do not unnecessarily expose subjects to risk, and (ii) 
whenever appropriate, by using procedures already being 
performed on the subjects for diagnostic or treatment 
purposes. 
(2) Risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated 
benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the 
knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result. . . . 
(3) Selection of subjects is equitable. . . . 
(4) Informed consent will be sought from each prospective 
subject or the subject’s legally authorized  
  representative. . . . 
(5) Informed consent will be appropriately documented or 
appropriately waived. . . . 
(6) When appropriate, the research plan makes adequate 
provision for monitoring the data collected to ensure the 
safety of subjects. . . . 
(7) When appropriate, there are adequate provisions to protect 
the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of 
data.45  
Additionally, the Common Rule requires that “[w]hen some or all of 
the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, such 
as children, prisoners, individuals with impaired decision-making 
capacity, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons, 
additional safeguards [to] have been included in the study to protect the 
 
 43. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Institutional Review Boards Frequently Asked 
Questions - Information Sheet, https://perma.cc/G7MX-9J8P (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 44. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a) (West 2018). 
 45. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1)–(7) (West 2018). 
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rights and welfare of these subjects.”46 In Section III.F, we examine 
whether NFL Combine participants might be considered a vulnerable 
population under the Common Rule. 
The Common Rule also contains detailed requirements for the 
composition of IRBs: 
Each IRB shall have at least five members, with varying backgrounds 
to promote complete and adequate review of research activities 
commonly conducted by the institution. The IRB shall be sufficiently 
qualified through the experience and expertise of its members 
(professional competence), and the diversity of the members, including 
consideration of race, gender, and cultural backgrounds and sensitivity 
to such issues as community attitudes, to promote respect for its advice 
and counsel in safeguarding the rights and welfare of human subjects. 
The IRB shall be able to ascertain the acceptability of proposed 
research in terms of institutional commitments (including policies and 
resources) and regulations, applicable law, and standards of 
professional conduct and practice. The IRB shall therefore include 
persons knowledgeable in these areas. If an IRB regularly reviews 
research that involves a vulnerable category of subjects, such as 
children, prisoners, individuals with impaired decision-making 
capacity, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons, 
consideration shall be given to the inclusion of one or more individuals 
who are knowledgeable about and experienced in working with these 
subjects.47 
Understanding how IRB review works in practice is also important. 
Many IRBs have created forms through which researchers address the 
requirements of the Common Rule.48 Researchers must also submit 
documents that will be used as part of the research, including scripts to be 
used to recruit participants and the forms to be used to document the 
subject’s consent to the research (if being used).49 The materials will then 
be reviewed by the IRB, which frequently requires modifications to be 
 
 46. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b). 
 47. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (West 2018). 
 48. See generally Creating and Submitting a New Application in ESTR, HARVARD 
UNIV., COMM. ON THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS, https://perma.cc/DD9Y-V6DK (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2019); see also 6 Tips For Speeding Up The Review of Your Application, 
HARVARD UNIV., COMM. ON THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS, https://perma.cc/FR5H-AMAZ 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 49. See, e.g., id. 
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made to the documents before it can be approved.50 Research cannot begin 
until all documents are approved by the IRB.51 
2. Informed Consent 
Informed consent is considered the “ethical cornerstone” and a 
“central tenet of biomedical research.”52 The Belmont Report declared that 
“[r]espect for persons requires that subjects, to the degree that they are 
capable, be given the opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen 
to them.”53 Moreover, the Belmont Report explained that informed 
consent generally requires “three elements: information, comprehension 
and voluntariness.”54 
The former version of the Common Rule codified these principles: 
[N]o investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research 
covered by this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally 
effective informed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally 
authorized representative. An investigator shall seek such consent only 
under circumstances that provide the prospective subject or the 
representative sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to 
participate and that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue 
influence. The information that is given to the subject or the 
representative shall be in language understandable to the subject or the 
representative. No informed consent, whether oral or written, may 
include any exculpatory language through which the subject or the 
representative is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject’s 
legal rights, or releases or appears to release the investigator, the 
sponsor, the institution or its agents from liability for negligence.55  
The revised Common Rule retains all of the above admonishments, 
only in a slightly altered format.56 In addition, the revised Common Rule  
provides some additional requirements and guidance: 
The prospective subject or the legally authorized representative must 
be provided with the information that a reasonable person would want 
 
 50. See Steven Joffe, Revolution or Reform in Human Subjects Research Oversight, 
40 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 922, 922–23 (2012) (discussing bureaucracy of IRBs); see also 
Todd J. Zywicki, Institutional Review Boards as Academic Bureaucracies: An Economic 
and Experiential Analysis, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 861, 866–67 (2007). 
 51. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(h) (West 2018) (“IRB approval means the determination 
of the IRB that the research has been reviewed and may be conducted at an institution with 
the constraints set forth by the IRB and by other institutional and federal requirements.”). 
 52. Capron, supra note 7, at 143 (internal citations omitted). 
 53. The Belmont Report, supra note 14 (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. 
 55. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005) (amended 2018). 
 56. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (West 2018). 
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to have in order to make an informed decision about whether to 
participate, and an opportunity to discuss that information. . . . 
Informed consent must begin with a concise and focused presentation 
of the key information that is most likely to assist a prospective subject 
or legally authorized representative in understanding the reasons why 
one might or might not want to participate in the research. This part of 
the informed consent must be organized and presented in a way that 
facilitates comprehension. 
Informed consent as a whole must present information in sufficient 
detail relating to the research, and must be organized and presented in 
a way that does not merely provide lists of isolated facts, but rather 
facilitates the prospective subject’s or legally authorized 
representative’s understanding of the reasons why one might or might 
not want to participate.57  
The Common Rule outlines the information that must be provided to the 
research participant “in seeking informed consent”: 
(1) A statement that the study involves research, an explanation of the 
purposes of the research and the expected duration of the subject’s 
participation, a description of the procedures to be followed, and 
identification of any procedures which are experimental; 
(2) A description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts 
to the subject; 
(3) A description of any benefits to the subject or others which may 
reasonably be expected from the research; 
(4) A disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of 
treatment, if any, that might be advantageous to the subject; 
(5) A statement describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality 
of records identifying the subject will be maintained; 
(6) For research involving more than minimal risk, an explanation as 
to whether any compensation and an explanation as to whether 
any medical treatments are available if injury occurs and, if so, 
what they consist of, or where further information may be 
obtained; 
(7) An explanation of whom to contact for answers to pertinent 
questions about the research and research subjects’ rights, and 
 
 57. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(4)–(5) (internal numbering omitted); see also Bierer, supra 
note 4, at 785 (“[T]here are still important gaps in the empirical data related to developing, 
organizing, and synthesizing what a reasonable person would want to know to make an 
informed decision. Questions also remain about how best to assess comprehension of 
prospective research participants.”). 
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whom to contact in the event of a research-related injury to the 
subject; and 
(8) A statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate 
will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is 
otherwise entitled, and the subject may discontinue participation 
at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject 
is otherwise entitled.58  
The revised Common Rule added a ninth requirement concerning 
secondary research: 
(9) One of the following statements about any research that involves 
the collection of identifiable private information or identifiable 
biospecimens: 
(i) A statement that identifiers might be removed from the 
identifiable private information or identifiable 
biospecimens and that, after such removal, the information 
or biospecimens could be used for future research studies 
or distributed to another investigator for future research 
studies without additional informed consent from the 
subject or the legally authorized representative, if this 
might be a possibility; or 
(ii) A statement that the subject’s information or biospecimens 
collected as part of the research, even if identifiers are 
removed, will not be used or distributed for future research 
studies.59  
This new requirement codifies the practice of “broad consent.”60 Broad 
consent permits researchers to use data from one study in future studies 
(1) if the data is de-identified, and (2) the research subject is made aware 
of this potential future use as part of the initial consent process. The 
practice of broad consent is intended to lessen the burdens in conducting 
secondary research61 and, as will be discussed below, may have future 
applicability in the NFL Combine setting. 
The Common Rule also identifies “[a]dditional elements” that might  
 
 
 
 
 58. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1)–(8) (2005) (amended 2018). 
 59. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(9) (West 2018). 
 60. See generally Mary Bernadette Ott & Gary Yingling, The Common Rule, 1 GUIDE 
TO GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE ¶ 1250 (West 2018).  
 61. See id. 
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need to be provided to the research participant in seeking informed 
consent: 
(1) A statement that the particular treatment or procedure may involve 
risks to the subject . . . that are currently unforeseeable; 
(2) Anticipated circumstances under which the subject’s participation 
may be terminated by the investigator without regard to the 
subject’s or the legally authorized representative’s consent; 
(3) Any additional costs to the subject that may result from 
participation in the research; 
(4) The consequences of a subject’s decision to withdraw from the 
research and procedures for orderly termination of participation 
by the subject; 
(5) A statement that significant new findings developed during the 
course of the research which may related to the subject’s 
willingness to continue participation will be provided to the 
subject; and 
(6) The approximate number of subjects involved in the study.62  
Despite the extensive requirements concerning informed consent, the 
Common Rule permits “an IRB to waive or alter consent” if five criteria 
are met: 
(i) The research involves no more than minimal risk to the 
subjects; 
(ii) The research could not practicably be carried out without the 
requested waiver or alteration; 
(iii) If the research involves using identifiable private information 
or identifiable biospecimens, the research could not 
practicably be carried out without using such information or 
biospecimens; 
(iv) The waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights 
and welfare of the subjects; and 
(v) Whenever appropriate, the subjects or legally authorized 
representatives will be provided with additional pertinent 
information after participation.63  
 
 62. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(c)(1)–(6) (West 2018). The revised Common Rule added 
additional provisions concerning biospecimens and clinical research that are not relevant 
here. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(c)(7)–(9).  
 63. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(f)(3).  
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Lastly, as a general rule, the Common Rule requires consent to be 
documented with the subject’s signature.64 Additionally, “[t]he 
investigator shall give either the subject or the subject’s legally authorized 
representative adequate opportunity to read the informed consent form 
before it is signed.”65 However, the IRB can waive documentation of 
consent if: (i) “the only record linking the subject and the research would 
be the consent document and the principal risk would be potential harm 
resulting from a breach of confidentiality”; (ii) “the research presents no 
more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and involves no procedures for 
which written consent is normally required outside of the research 
context”; or (iii) “the subjects or legally authorized representatives are 
members of a distinct cultural group or community in which signing forms 
is not the norm . . . .”66 
Importantly, the Common Rule does not say that providing a research 
participant with the above information—or having the participant sign a 
form indicating they were provided with such information—establishes 
informed consent. Indeed, OHRP, in its guidance on the Common Rule, 
states that “even if a signed consent form is required, it alone does not 
constitute an adequate consent process.”67 
Determining when informed consent for purposes of human subjects 
research is obtained is not clear. The Common Rule requires “legally 
effective informed consent.”68 According to OHRP, “[i]nformed consent 
is legally effective if it is both obtained from the subject or the subject’s 
legally authorized representative and documented in a manner that is 
consistent with the [Common Rule] and with applicable laws of the 
jurisdiction in which the research is conducted.”69 While this definition 
appears somewhat circular, OHRP’s guidance also states that “[t]he 
informed consent process should ensure that all critical information about 
a study is completely disclosed, and that prospective subjects or their 
legally authorized representatives adequately understand the research so 
that they can make informed decisions.”70 
The Common Rule provides additional guidance by indicating that 
informed consent requires investigators to “minimize the possibility of 
coercion or undue influence.”71 Nevertheless, this requirement raises the 
 
 64. 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(a) (West 2018).  
 65. 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(b)(1). 
 66. 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(c)(1). 
 67. Informed Consent FAQs, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., 
https://perma.cc/99A8-8JMT (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Informed Consent 
FAQs]. 
 68. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1) (West 2018). 
 69. Informed Consent FAQs, supra note 67. 
 70. Id. 
 71. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2).  
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question of the meanings of coercion and undue influence in the human 
subjects research context. 
a. Defining Coercion and Undue Influence 
The Common Rule does not define coercion or undue influence but 
nevertheless, there is guidance on the issue. The Belmont Report states 
that: 
An agreement to participate in research constitutes a valid consent only 
if voluntarily given. This element of informed consent requires 
conditions free of coercion and undue influence. Coercion occurs 
when an overt threat of harm is intentionally presented by one person 
to another in order to obtain compliance. Undue influence, by 
contrast, occurs through an offer of an excessive, unwarranted, 
inappropriate or improper reward or other overture in order to obtain 
compliance. Also, inducements that would ordinarily be acceptable 
may become undue influences if the subject is especially vulnerable.72  
In responding to the frequently asked question “What does it mean to 
minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence?”, OHRP’s 
guidance is nearly identical to that of the Belmont Report’s.73 One key 
distinction is that OHRP’s guidance states that coercion can also occur 
through an “implicit” threat of harm.74 This additional language might be 
important, as discussed in Section III.E. 
While some IRB members might conflate the two terms,75 coercion 
and undue influence should be thought of as distinct concepts.76 Generally 
speaking, coercion occurs where the potential participant faces a “worse 
consequence,” while undue influence occurs where the potential 
participant is being offered a “positive good.”77 
When coercion or undue influence has taken place is still an unclear 
issue. Research has not revealed any case decisions on the matter and 
OHRP’s database of “determinations of noncompliance”78 also does not 
provide any helpful guidance. While the database does include a variety 
 
 72. The Belmont Report, supra note 14 (emphasis added). 
 73. See Informed Consent FAQs, supra note 67. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Emily A. Largent & Holly F. Lynch, Paying Research Participants: 
Regulatory Uncertainty, Conceptual Confusion, and a Path Forward, 17 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 61, 115 (2017) (detailing survey conducted of IRB members and their 
understanding of the terms “coercion” and “undue influence”). 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. at 112 (quoting Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Ending Concerns About Undue 
Inducement, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 100, 101 (2004)). 
 78. OHRP Determination Letters and Other Correspondence, OFFICE FOR HUMAN 
RESEARCH PROTS., https://perma.cc/47GP-LYUP (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).  
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of letters to various institutions concerning informed consent in particular 
research studies, OHRP’s responses merely express a general concern that 
all of the enumerated elements of informed consent required by the 
Common Rule have been established.79 
Without specific guidance or findings in the ethical and regulatory 
fields, state law might provide another useful avenue for examining 
compliance with the Common Rule. As stated above, the informed consent 
process must also comply with the law of the state in which the research 
is being conducted.80 There is a large body of case law on coercion and 
undue influence within each state’s jurisprudence, particularly on issues 
concerning criminal law,81 contracts82 and wills and estates.83 On this 
front, the Restatements of Law from the American Law Institute, which 
seek to summarize general principles of law, are a helpful generalization 
of state laws. 
Multiple Restatements of Law categorize coercion as a synonym for 
“duress.”84 According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, duress 
occurs where: (1) “a person physically compels conduct that appears to be 
a manifestation of assent by a party who has no intention of engaging in 
that conduct”; or, (2) “a person makes an improper threat that induces a 
 
 79. See, e.g., Letter from Kristina C. Borror, Director, Division of Compliance 
Oversight, Office for Human Research Protections, to Harry W. Orf, Senior Vice President 
for Research, Massachusetts General Hospital (Oct. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/Q7MS-
VJEG; Letter from Kristina C. Borror, Director, Division of Compliance Oversight, Office 
for Human Research Protections, to Stephen Welter, Vice-President for Research, San 
Diego State University (Feb. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/BKK9-X55Z.  
 80. See Informed Consent FAQs, supra note 67 (“Informed consent is legally effective 
if it is both obtained from the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative and 
documented in a manner that is consistent with the [Common Rule] and with applicable 
laws of the jurisdiction in which the research is conducted.”) (emphasis added); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 46.116(i) (West 2018) (“The informed consent requirements in [the Common Rule] are 
not intended to preempt any applicable federal, state, or local laws which require additional 
information to be disclosed in order to for informed consent to be legally effective.”). 
 81. See, e.g., People v. Case, 418 P.3d 360, 379–80 (Cal. 2018) (examining whether 
criminal defendant’s statements were coerced); People v. Zadran, 314 P.3d 830, 833–35 
(Colo. 2013) (same); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1044–47 (R.I. 2000) (examining 
whether witnesses’ statements were coerced). 
 82. See, e.g., Gelber v. Glock, 800 S.E.2d 800, 815–18 (Va. 2017) (examining whether 
to set aside a contract for undue influence); Albert v. Albert, 108 A.3d 388, 392–93 (Me. 
2015) (same). 
 83. See, e.g., Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 418–21 (Tex. 2017) (examining 
whether trust was amended before death as a result of undue influence); Williams v. 
Hubbard, 455 S.W.3d 426, 433–39 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (examining whether decedent’s 
nonprobate transfers resulted from undue influence). 
 84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT Index C100 
(AM. LAW INST. 2018) (instructing reader to “See DURESS”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS Index C360 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) 
(same); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS Index C190 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (same). 
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party who has no reasonable alternative to manifesting his assent.”85 In the 
first case, no enforceable contract can be created, while in the second, the 
contract is voidable at the victim’s discretion.86 The wrongful conduct can 
be implied.87 
On undue influence, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states 
that: 
Undue influence involves unfair persuasion, a milder form of pressure 
than duress. Such persuasion nevertheless makes the contract voidable 
if it is exercised on a party who is under the domination of the person 
exercising it or is, by virtue of his relation with that person, justified in 
assuming that this person will not act in a manner inconsistent with his 
welfare.88  
Finally, an additional persuasive authority on the definitions of 
coercion and undue influence under state law is Black’s Law Dictionary, 
the leading legal dictionary. Black’s defines coercion as “[c]ompulsion of 
a free agent by physical, moral, or economic force or threat of physical 
force”89 and undue influence as “[t]he improper use of power or trust in a 
way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another’s objective; 
the exercise of enough control over another person that a questioned act 
by this person would not have otherwise been performed, the person’s free 
agency having been overmastered.”90 
The definitions used by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and 
Black’s Law Dictionary differ slightly from those of the Belmont Report 
and OHRP. This is important for the fact that conduct that might not rise 
to the level of illegality, might still be ethically problematic. Nevertheless, 
because research governed by the Common Rule must comply with both 
the Common Rule and state law, these definitions should only expand the 
type of conduct that could be considered in violation of the Common Rule. 
 
 85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 7, topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
 86. See id. 
 87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. a (AM LAW INST. 1981) (“[I]f 
one person strikes or imprisons another, the conduct may amount to duress because of the 
threat of further blows or continued imprisonment that is implied.”); see also King v. 
Donnkenny, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738–40 (W.D. Va. 2000); Comcast of Oregon II, Inc. 
v. City of Eugene, 155 P.3d 99, 107 (Or. Ct. App. 2007); State Nat’l Bank v. Farah Mfg. 
Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 685 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). 
 88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch.7, topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
 89. Coercion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 90. Undue Influence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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Ultimately, determining whether informed consent has been 
obtained, taking into account the factors mentioned in these definitions, is 
the IRB’s responsibility.91 
 
*** 
 
With the above understanding of the Common Rule’s requirements, 
background on the NFL Combine is provided, before analyzing the two 
together. 
III. THE NFL COMBINE 
The NFL Combine is an annual event each February in which 
approximately three hundred of the best college football players undergo 
medical examinations, intelligence tests, interviews and multiple football 
and other athletic drills and tests in the hopes of demonstrating their 
prowess and landing a spot in the NFL.92 Although called the NFL 
Combine, the event is technically organized by National Invitational 
Camp, Inc., the legal entity that is the Combine,93 a subsidiary of National 
Football Scouting, Inc. National Football Scouting is an organization that 
provides scouting services to NFL clubs and which is owned and managed 
as a joint endeavor by 20 of the NFL’s 32 clubs.94 Nevertheless, the NFL 
exercises considerable control over the Combine, including helping to 
make decisions about the drills that players perform, selling public tickets, 
and broadcasting the event on television.95 
The importance of the Combine to its participants cannot be 
understated—it is routinely called the “biggest job interview of their 
lives.”96 NFL club executives, coaches, scouts, doctors and athletic 
trainers attend the Combine to evaluate the players for the upcoming NFL 
 
 91. See Informed Consent FAQs, supra note 67 (“It is up to the IRB to use its 
discretion in determining which circumstances give rise to undue influence. . . . IRBs must 
be vigilant about minimizing the possibility for coercion and undue influence.”). 
 92. NFL SCOUTING COMBINE, http://www.nflcombine.net/ (last visited Mar. 15, 
2019).  
 93. See Bill Bradley, Jeff Foster Talks About Challenges of Hosting NFL Scouting 
Combine, NFL.COM (Feb. 18, 2014, 2:53 PM), https://perma.cc/JEX3-FY3H [hereinafter 
Bradley, Jeff Foster] (discussing National Football Scouting, Inc.’s operation of the NFL 
Combine).  
 94. Bill Bradley, Too much overlap caused NFL to create annual Scouting Combine, 
NFL.COM (Feb. 17, 2014, 2:27 PM), https://perma.cc/FH4X-XZK8. 
 95. Albert Breer, NFL Scouting Combine’s evolution raises questions about future, 
NFL.COM (Feb. 18, 2013, 12:17 PM), https://perma.cc/579Q-6Y2N. 
 96. See Ali Bhanpuri et al., The Ultimate Interview: Preparing for the NFL Scouting 
Combine, NFL.com, http://www.nfl.com/combinestories (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); see 
also Keiana Martin, NFL Scouting Combine 101: What You Need to Know, CHIEFS.COM 
(Feb. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/EZ7H-94A7. 
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Draft (usually in April).97 In the 2016 NFL Draft, 83.6% of players that 
were drafted participated at the NFL Combine.98 And, of those draftees 
that were not invited to the Combine, none were selected before the 4th 
round of the Draft.99 One of the most important parts of the Combine are 
the 15 minute interviews in which club executives and coaches question 
players about football, but also their personal lives and a wide variety of 
other topics.100 The players are undoubtedly under immense pressure to 
impress the clubs during the multi-day Combine.101 
While the interviews are critical, according to Jeff Foster, the 
President of National Football Scouting, all 32 NFL clubs consider the 
medical exams (and not the athletic drills or interviews) to be the most 
important part of the Combine.102 Since 1987, doctors with IU Health,103 a 
healthcare system affiliated with Indiana University School of Medicine, 
perform x-rays, MRIs and other exams at each year’s Combine.104 The IU 
Health examinations are performed on behalf of the Combine, who then 
provides the results to NFL clubs. After the examinations performed by 
IU Health doctors, club doctors also examine the participants. The medical 
examinations at the Combine generally include x-rays, MRIs, 
echocardiograms, and blood analysis.105 Participants must also take a drug 
test.106 Dr. Richard Kovacs, a cardiologist with IU Health describes the 
 
 97. See NFL SCOUTING COMBINE, supra note 92.  
 98. See Notable current NFL players who weren’t invited to the combine, NFL.COM 
(Feb. 6, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://perma.cc/DML9-8SMX.  
 99. See id. 
 100. See Jenny Vrentas, Behind Closed Doors at the NFL Combine, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/PL8G-CNWG; see also Rodger Sherman, 
The Weirdest, Dumbest Questions NFL Teams Ask Players at the Combine, 
SBNATION.COM (Feb. 25, 2016, 4:29 PM), https://perma.cc/YC9U-QDT8.  
 101. See id. 
 102. See Breer, supra note 95.  
 103. See Bradley, Jeff Foster, supra note 93. 
 104. See id. (describing IU doctors as “handl[ing] all of the testing, imaging and 
reporting of the standard and special battery of tests that we do on each athlete”); see also 
Breer, supra note 95 (describing IU doctors as having been “a combine partner for 28 
years,” and noting that “350 MRIs were conducted on 330 players in a four-day period, 
with IU Health”); see also About IU Health, IND. U. HEALTH, https://iuhealth.org/about-
our-system (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 105. See Shalise Manza Young, Healthy status: Lotulelei at top after heart scare, BOS. 
GLOBE, Apr. 19, 2013, 2013 WLNR 9554561; see also Jarrett Bell, NFL Combine: All the 
Buzz, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 2005, 2005 WLNR 3112818; see also Mike Chappell, NFL’s 
health assurance plan, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 19, 2004, 2004 WLNR 23116329. 
 106. See Matt Bowen, McClellin’s shift to LB, plus fresh talent have potential to help 
defense, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2014, 2014 WLNR 16913612 (discussing player’s failed drug 
test at Combine); see also Ralph Vacchiano, NY Giants cornerback Jayron Hosley gets 
four-game suspension for violating NFL’s drug policy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 5, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/U64B-K6AN (same). 
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medical exams as “the choke point, . . . [n]o one goes to [the Combine] 
until they go through us.”107 
In a 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law Review article, my co-
authors and I explained the ways in which the medical exams at the NFL 
Combine likely violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).108 The 
ADA prohibits pre-employment medical exams.109 As discussed above, 
the NFL Combine is principally a forum for pre-employment medical 
exams of prospective NFL players. Despite their apparent violation of the 
law, the medical exams at the Combine have existed for decades and 
continue to exist. 
To facilitate these examinations and the exchange of medical 
information that takes place, participants in the Combine are requested to 
sign two documents: (1) an authorization for the use and disclosure of 
records and information; and, (2) an authorization for release and 
disclosure of medical and mental health records.110 
The authorization for use and disclosure of records and information 
form permits a wide range of individuals and entities to use, release and 
disclose a player’s medical records, including but not limited to the 
Combine, the NFL, all NFL clubs, NFL club medical staff, and various 
NFL health-related consultants. Similarly, the authorization for the release 
and disclosure of medical and mental health records authorizes any entity 
that possess a player’s medical records, including healthcare providers, 
schools and others, to release those records to the Combine, the NFL, all 
NFL clubs, NFL club medical staff, and various NFL health-related 
consultants.111 As discussed at the outset, many of the authors of the 
research studies at issue were NFL club medical staff and thus, under these 
documents, were authorized to receive and use player medical 
information. 
As a practical matter, players sign the authorizations as requested. If 
a player refused to sign the authorization, a club might lack medical 
information essential in considering whether to draft the player, potentially 
preventing the player from being drafted at all. Additionally, the player 
 
 107. Dana Hunsinger Benbow, The real reason for the NFL Scouting Combine, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Feb. 25, 2016, 9:06 AM), https://perma.cc/4WU7-ZKVM.  
 108. See Jessica L. Roberts, I. Glenn Cohen, Christopher R. Deubert & Holly 
Fernandez Lynch, Evaluating NFL Player Health and Performance: Legal and Ethical 
Issues, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 263–64 (2017). 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 110. See Roberts et al., supra note 108, online apps. B, C.  
 111. The authorization forms may also raise concerns as to compliance with the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). For more on HIPAA and the NFL, 
see CHRISTOPHER R. DEUBERT ET AL., PROTECTING AND PROMOTING THE HEALTH OF NFL 
PLAYERS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, THE FOOTBALL 
PLAYERS HEALTH STUDY AT HARVARD UNIV. 102–03 (2016), https://perma.cc/2G2X-
NL4R. 
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does not want to risk angering the NFL or a club by refusing to sign, which 
would also threaten his Draft status. As a result, players, throughout their 
NFL careers, routinely sign such authorizations or waivers when 
requested.112 
There is an additionally relevant point about the nature of the 
authorization forms. Both of the authorizations state that they were 
“collectively bargained for by the National Football League and the 
National Football League Players Association [NFLPA],” the players’ 
labor union. However, the NFLPA has no authority to collectively bargain 
on behalf of Combine participants because the Combine participants are 
not yet part of the bargaining unit represented by the NFLPA. As stated in 
the NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the bargaining 
unit consists of: 
(1) All professional football players employed by a member club of the 
National Football League; (2) All professional football players who 
have been previously employed by a member club of the National 
Football League who are seeking employment with an NFL Club; 
(3) All rookie players once they are selected in the current year’s NFL 
College Draft; and (4) all undrafted rookie players once they 
commence negotiation with an NFL Club concerning employment as 
a player.113  
Combine participants do not fit into any of these categories, and thus, the 
fact that the NFLPA agreed to the authorization forms has no legal effect. 
Finally, clarifying the role of these authorization forms as they relate 
to studies governed by (and thus not exempt from) the Common Rule is 
important. While these forms permit the broad disclosure and use of player 
medical information, they cannot be used to justify the use of player 
medical information in medical studies as they do not meet the 
requirements of the Common Rule. For example, they do not include the 
information generally required as part of seeking informed consent, such 
as an explanation of the research,114 a description of any reasonably 
foreseeable risks or discomforts,115 or a description of any benefits to the 
subject or others which may reasonably be expected from the research,116 
among others.117 Thus, if studies utilizing data gathered from the NFL 
Combine are subject to the Common Rule (as will be analyzed below), 
 
 112.  Id. at 99 n.k. 
 113. See NFL-NFLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT pmbl. (2011), 
https://perma.cc/M8S9-UAVH [hereinafter NFL-NFLPA CBA]. 
 114. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1) (West 2018). 
 115. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2). 
 116. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(3). 
 117. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (listing the information that must be provided to the 
research participant “in seeking informed consent”). 
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they must use their own forms in gaining players’ informed consent (or 
otherwise obtain permission to waive consent), an issue discussed in 
Section III.E below. 
 
*** 
 
 With an understanding of the NFL Combine, this article moves on 
to examine the research that has been conducted via the NFL Combine, 
and applying human subjects research regulations to this research. 
IV. APPLYING HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH REGULATIONS TO 
RESEARCH CONDUCTED VIA THE NFL COMBINE 
By searching PubMed, an online database of biomedical publications 
maintained by the United States National Library of Medicine at the 
National Institutes of Health,118 I identified 42 studies that have been 
published using medical data gathered at the NFL Combine. A list of these 
studies is included as Appendix A. 
The studies variably provide information relevant to analyzing their 
compliance with the Common Rule. In an attempt to gain more 
information, I emailed at least one co-author of all 42 studies. As some 
doctors were co-authors of several studies, in total I contacted 14 
doctors.119 I emailed the doctors a total of three times each during the 
summer of 2018. No doctors provided a substantive response. 
The doctors’ failure to respond limits the analysis. Nevertheless, 
using the information provided in the studies, this Part examines the 
studies through the lens of the Common Rule. More specifically, I 
consider: (a) whether the studies are “research” as defined by the Common 
Rule; (b) whether the research is governed by the Common Rule; (c) 
whether the research is exempt from the Common Rule; (d) whether an 
IRB approved the research; (e) whether informed consent could have been 
waived; (f) whether informed consent was obtained; and (g) whether NFL 
 
 118. See PubMed Help, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOETHICAL INFO. (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK3827/#pubmedhelp.FAQs.  
 119. Specifically, I contacted: Matthew T. Provencher (co-author of studies  1, 3, 5, 6, 
8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16 in Appendix A); Derrick M. Knapik (studies 2, 7, 10, 14, and 
17); Brian J. Rebolledo (study 4); Daniel Gibbs (studies 18, 19, 20, and 21); Gary Solomon 
(study 22); Chris Brown (study 23); Gary Kiebzak (studies 24 and 25); Dominic Carreira 
(study 26); Chris Larson (study 27); Robert Brophy (studies 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 
and 39); Lee Kaplan (studies 31, 37, and 40); Kurt Hirshorn (study 34); Jon E. Browne 
(study 41); Helene Pavlov (study 42); and Russell F. Warren (study 42). I asked the doctors: 
(1) Was informed consent obtained from the NFL Combine participants? (a) If so, can you 
please briefly describe the process for obtaining consent or provide me with a copy of the 
consent form? (b) If informed consent was not obtained, why not? (2) Was the medial data 
you analyzed de-identified? (3) Did any players decline to participate in the study? 
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Combine participants should be considered a vulnerable research 
population. 
A. Is it Research? 
As an initial matter, research is only subject to the Common Rule if 
it fits within the definition of research as defined by the Common Rule.120 
As mentioned earlier, the Common Rule defines research as “a systematic 
investigation, including research development, testing, and evaluation, 
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.”121 The 
medical studies discussed in this Article are a classic type of research 
contemplated by the Common Rule.122 The studies do not concern the 
treatment of an individual patient, but are instead designed to “test an 
hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or 
contribute to generalizable knowledge”123 in the field through publication. 
Indeed, the American Journal of Sports Medicine, the journal in 
which 12 of the studies have been published, states that “[t]he journal acts 
as an important forum for independent orthopaedic sports medicine 
research and education, allowing clinical practitioners the ability to make 
decisions based on sound scientific information.”124 For example, in a 
2010 article in the journal utilizing medical data from the Combine, the 
researchers concluded that “[a] history of shoulder stabilization shortens 
the expected career of a professional football player, particularly for 
linemen and linebackers. Further research is warranted to better 
understand how these injuries and surgeries affect an athlete’s career and 
what can be done to improve the long-term outcome after treatment.”125 
This article contributed to the “generalizable knowledge” of NFL clubs 
and their medical personnel, particularly in the Draft analyses. There is 
thus little doubt that the studies published using medical data gathered at 
the NFL Combine are research within the meaning of the Common Rule. 
 
 120. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (West 2018) (“[T]his policy applies to all research 
involving human subjects conducted, supported, or otherwise subject to regulation by any 
Federal department or agency that takes appropriate administrative action to make the 
policy applicable to such research.”) (emphasis added). 
 121. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (West 2018). 
 122. See BARUCH A. BRODY, THE ETHICS OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 37–  
38 (1998). 
 123. See id. (quoting The Belmont Report, supra note 14, and discussing what 
constitutes “research”). 
 124. See The American Journal of Sports Medicine¸ SAGE PUBLISHING, 
https://bit.ly/2ODScWO (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 125. Robert H. Brophy et al., Effect of Shoulder Stabilization on Career Length in 
National Football League Athletes, 39 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 704, 704 (2010). 
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B. Is the Research Governed by the Common Rule? 
As explained in Section I.B, the Common Rule has historically only 
governed research supported by the federal government or that is being 
conducted at an institution that has agreed that all of its research will 
comply with the Common Rule, i.e., “checking the box,” via an FWA. 
None of the studies indicate that they were supported by the federal 
government. Thus, the Combine studies are only subject to the Common 
Rule if one or more of the investigators worked at an institution that 
provided an FWA and “checked the box.” 
By searching OHRP’s database of approved FWAs,126 I determined 
that all 42 of the studies utilizing medical data collected at the NFL 
Combine were conducted by at least one medical professional that worked 
at an institution that currently has an FWA, indicating that the institution 
has likely sought federal research funding and thus agreed to comply with 
the Common Rule as a result. 
Nevertheless, information on whether an institution checked the box 
is not publicly available.127 Thus, it cannot be said with certainty that all 
of the research was being conducted by at least one institution that checked 
the box, and therefore, voluntarily agreed to comply with the Common 
Rule. However, as noted above, approximately two-thirds of American 
colleges and universities did previously check the box.128 Moreover, given 
that the vast majority of the researchers worked at large, national 
universities and/or medical centers, it seems likely that most (if not all) of 
the research discussed herein was subject to the Common Rule. 
C. Is the Research Exempt from the Common Rule? 
As discussed in Section III.B, some secondary research is exempt 
from the Common Rule.129 Secondary research relevant to this Article 
consists of one of two types: (1) research using “publicly available” 
“identifiable private information,”130 or (2) research using information that 
“is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that the identity of the 
human subjects cannot readily be ascertained directly or through 
identifiers linked to the subjects, the investigator does not contact the 
subjects, and the investigator will not re-identify subjects.”131 
 
 126. See Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) Database for Registered 
IORGs & IRBs, Approved FWAs, and Documents Received in Last 60 Days, OFFICE FOR 
HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., https://bit.ly/2yCK7rj (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 127. E-mail from Jaime O. Hernandez, supra note 42. 
 128. See Blatt et al., supra note 40. 
 129. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b) (West 2018) (listing exemptions to the Common Rule). 
 130. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(i) (West 2018). 
 131. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(ii). 
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The secondary research exemption thus requires us to consider three 
questions. First, did the data studied exist prior to the study? If the answer 
is “no,” then the study is not secondary research and is thus not exempt 
from the Common Rule under the secondary research exemption. If the 
answer is “yes,” then we must turn to the second question—is the data 
publicly available? If the answer is “yes,” then the study is exempt from 
the Common Rule. If the answer is “no,” we turn to the third question—
was the data recorded and maintained in a de-identified manner? If the 
answer is “yes,” then the study is exempt from the Common Rule. But if 
the answer is “no,” the study must comply with the Common Rule. 
The answer to the first question is “yes.” A review of the studies at 
hand shows that all 42 studies relied on pre-existing data.132 Specifically, 
all of the studies relied largely on the medical information collected by 
doctors and athletic trainers working at the Combine. In 2012, the NFL 
clubs and the Combine instituted a “fully digitized” system of player 
medical records, making review and research much easier.133 Since that 
time, several studies have referenced having “obtained [data] from the 
database organized by the NFL medical personnel for compilation of the 
medical and physical performance examination results of [players] 
participating in the NFL Combine.”134 Since the studies are relying on pre-
existing data, they are secondary research potentially exempt from the 
Common Rule, requiring consideration of the second question. 
The answer to the second question—whether the player medical data 
collected at the NFL Combine is publicly available—is “no.” As a general 
rule, the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) and certain states’ laws require healthcare providers covered by 
the law to obtain an individual’s authorization before disclosing health 
information.135 While the Combine participants execute broad waivers that 
permit their medical information to be shared with the NFL, NFL clubs 
 
 132. See infra Appendix A. 
 133. Derrick M. Knapik et al., Recurrent Labral Tearing on Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging Is Not Predictive of Diminished Participation Among National Football League 
Athletes, 34 ARTHROSCOPY 66, 67 (2018). 
 134. Catherine A. Logan et al., Posterior Cruciate Ligament Injuries of the Knee at the 
National Football League Combine: An Imaging and Epidemiology Study, 34 
ARTHROSCOPY 681, 682 (2018); see also Jorge Chahla et al., Posterolateral Corner Injuries 
of the Knee at the National Football League Combine: An Imaging and Outcomes Analysis, 
34 ARTHROSCOPY 687, 688 (2018); Leigh-Anne Tu et al., Prevalence of Jones Fracture 
Repair and Impact on Short-Term NFL Participation, 39 FOOT & ANKLE INT’L 6, 7 (2018) 
(referencing having obtained data from “the NFL Combine database”). 
 135. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (West 2018) (“A covered entity or business associate 
may not use or disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required by 
[other law].”). See generally Morgan Leigh Tendam, The HIPAA-POTA-Mess: How 
HIPAA’s Weak Enforcement Standards Have Led States to Create Confusing Medical 
Privacy Remedies, 79 OHIO ST. L. J. 411, 425-26 (2018). 
  
2019 THE COMBINE AND THE COMMON RULE 331 
and related parties,136 the waivers do not permit the disclosure of their 
medical information to the general public.137 
With the second question answered in the negative, the studies can 
only be exempt from the Common Rule as secondary research if the data 
“is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that the identity of the 
human subjects cannot readily be ascertained directly or through 
identifiers linked to the subjects, the investigator does not contact the 
subjects, and the investigator will not re-identify subjects.”138 This is 
where the analysis gets more challenging and uncertain. 
As an initial matter, medical data about Combine participants is 
certainly collected in an identifiable manner in the first instance—the 
entire purpose of the medical examinations at the Combine is to 
understand specific players’ medical conditions as part of the clubs’ 
evaluations of the players. From there, none of the studies in Appendix A 
mentions any efforts to record the data for their studies in a de-identified 
manner, though that is not generally information included in a research 
article. 
Understanding the studies discussed is helpful in analyzing this issue. 
Twenty-four of the studies analyzed the NFL performance of Combine 
participants whose Combine medical records revealed certain medical 
conditions.139 These studies necessarily involved creating a database of 
players with the medical condition being examined and then inputting the 
NFL playing statistics of those players. It is challenging—but not 
impossible—to imagine that the researchers recorded their study data—as 
opposed to the Combine’s database—in a de-identified manner. To do so, 
the researchers seemingly would have had to: (1) have had access to player 
medical records in an identified form; (2) not copy or record those medical 
records in an identified form; (3) use that access to count the number of 
players with the condition and their position (or other information relevant 
to the study) but without recording their identity; (4) also use that access 
to find the players with the condition without recording their identity; and 
(5) then record those players’ statistics without also recording their 
identity. This process is burdensome and seems prone to mistake, 
particularly if the statistical analysis is being done prospectively or 
contemporaneously with the player’s NFL career. It seems more likely that 
the researchers: (1) examined player medical records through the NFL 
Combine’s database; (2) identified those players with the medical 
 
 136. See PRITTS supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 137. By comparison, once in the League, players do execute waivers permitting public 
disclosure of their medical information for, among other things, NFL injury reports. See 
DEUBERT ET AL., supra note 111, at 17.  
 138. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(ii) (West 2018). 
 139. See infra Appendix A, studies 1–3, 6–10, 12–21, 25–26, 32–33, 35–36, 38. 
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condition at issue; (3) created a new database of those afflicted players; 
and (4) inserted and analyzed the statistical performance of those players. 
Moreover, there are certain factors that would also make de-
identification challenging for these performance studies. Ten of the studies 
had study populations of less than 50 players.140 When you begin including 
those players’ years played, positions, and statistics, it would seem that at 
least some of them could be easily identified by looking at NFL.com’s 
database of player statistics. For example, a hypothetical 2015 Combine 
attendee who suffered a torn ACL in college, plays wide receiver, and 
scored 4 touchdowns in his rookie year would likely be a population of 
very few. Nevertheless, none of the studies described their processes in a 
level of detail sufficient to definitively state whether or not they were using 
de-identified data. 
In addition to the performance studies, two studies analyzed whether 
players with certain medical conditions were drafted.141 These studies 
would likely have gone through one of the processes described above to 
collect their data. Nevertheless, without the additional component of 
examining multiple years of NFL player statistics, these studies might be 
more amenable to de-identified recording. 
Removing the 26 performance and draftee studies discussed above 
leaves 16 other studies to consider. These studies are varied but many 
concern the prevalence of a condition142 or the success of prior treatments 
of various conditions143 among the NFL Combine participant population. 
These studies could have fairly easily recorded their study data in a de-
identified manner depending on the manner in which the NFL Combine 
player data was initially stored. With the advent of the NFL Combine’s 
digital medical records system, it seems likely that a player’s name and 
other identifying information (such as position, college, hometown, etc.) 
could be removed as necessary. Nevertheless, as will be elaborated on 
below, 10 of these 16 studies144 mention having received IRB approval—
suggesting the authors did not believe their studies were exempt from the 
Common Rule. 
In sum, whether the studies discussed in this Article are exempt from 
the Common Rule is unclear. At the same time, there are various pieces of 
evidence that suggest many of them are not. If the studies are not exempt, 
the Common Rule requires their approval by an IRB. 
 
 140. See infra Appendix A, studies 2, 7–8, 12–14, 16, 18–19, 32. 
 141. See infra Appendix A, studies 3, 27. 
 142. See infra Appendix A, studies 5, 23, 30, 34, 39–42.  
 143. See infra Appendix A, studies 11, 28–29. 
 144. See infra Appendix A, studies 4–5, 22, 24, 29–30, 34, 37, 39–40. 
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D. Was IRB Approval Obtained? 
Assuming the studies are subject to the Common Rule—as it seems 
most are—we can now turn to examining whether the studies complied 
with the Common Rule. The first part of this analysis is evaluating whether 
the studies were approved by an IRB, as required by the Common Rule for 
non-exempt research.145 Twenty-seven of the 42 studies specifically 
reference IRB approval.146 Thus, while it is possible that some of the 
studies did not obtain IRB approval, it is unlikely. As explained above, the 
studies were generally conducted by highly-qualified medical 
professionals affiliated with respected universities and medical 
institutions. IRBs are a fact of life in academic medicine and there is no 
reason to think these studies were handled any differently. 
E. Could Informed Consent Have Been Waived? 
As discussed in Section 1.C.2, informed consent is an important 
requirement of the Common Rule. Nevertheless, as also discussed in that 
Section, informed consent can be waived if five criteria are met: 
(i) The research involves no more than minimal risk to the 
subjects; 
(ii) The research could not practicably be carried out without the 
requested waiver or alteration; 
(iii) If the research involves using identifiable private information 
or identifiable biospecimens, the research could not 
practicably be carried out without using such information or 
biospecimens; 
(iv) The waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights 
and welfare of the subjects; and 
(v) Whenever appropriate, the subjects or legally authorized 
representatives will be provided with additional pertinent 
information after participation.147 
Some of the studies possibly met the criteria to waive consent. 
First, most (if not all) of the studies are minimal risk. “Minimal risk 
means that the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort 
anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those 
 
 145. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a) (West 2018) (“An IRB shall review and have authority to 
approve, require modifications in (to secure approval), or disapprove all research activities 
covered by this policy.”). 
 146. See infra Appendix A, studies 1-10, 12-17, 22, 24, 25, 29-31, 33-34, 37, 39, 40.  
 147. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(f)(3) (West 2018). 
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ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine 
physical or psychological examinations or tests.”148 Generally speaking, 
none of the studies involved medical interventions and all of the medical 
data came from exams that the players were already undergoing as part of 
the NFL Combine. The players did not suffer any medical harm or 
discomfort from the studies. 
Second, consent could have been impractical for some of the studies. 
For studies that used data from multiple years ago, it would have been 
extremely challenging to track down hundreds or thousands of former 
NFL Combine participants and ask for their consent to the research. But 
for studies that began on or around the same year for which data was 
analyzed, the researchers could have sought the participants’ consent at 
the Combine. 
Third, which studies could or could not have been conducted without 
using identifiable private information is questionable. As discussed in 
Section III.C, determining which of the research might have been able to, 
as a practical matter, successfully record their study data in a de-identified 
manner is challenging. 
Fourth, there is a strong argument that waiver of consent could 
adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects. As discussed above, 
most of the studies are aimed at understanding how a player’s medical 
condition might affect his performance in the NFL. If a study revealed that 
players with a certain knee condition were statistically less successful than 
comparable players without the knee condition, the players with the knee 
condition would likely have serious reservations about participating in 
such a study. It would not make sense for a player to voluntarily participate 
in a study that decreased his Draft status and prospects in the NFL. 
Fifth, the studies likely did not provide the subjects with additional 
information after participation. Indeed, for reasons discussed below, it 
seems unlikely players have any idea this research is occurring. Moreover, 
providing the NFLPA with additional information is also not sufficient. 
As discussed in Section II, the NFLPA does not represent Combine 
participants because the participants are not yet within the NFLPA’s 
bargaining unit and thus the NFLPA would not qualify as a legally 
authorized representative. 
In sum, while some of the studies might have met the criteria to waive 
consent, in general the sum of the factors weighs against waiver. 
 
 148. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(j) (West 2018). 
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F. Was Informed Consent Obtained? 
Assuming informed consent could not be waived, whether the 
Combine participants are providing informed consent for the research 
studies is unclear. As discussed in Section I.C.2, the Common Rule lists 
the information that must or should be provided to a research subject as 
part of obtaining informed consent. However, as also discussed in that 
Section, obtaining a signed consent form does not mean that informed 
consent was actually obtained. Instead, informed consent is a process that 
ensures that the research subject can make an informed decision 
reasonably free of coercion and duress.149 
As discussed above, nearly all (if not all) of the studies utilizing NFL 
Combine participants as research subjects were IRB-approved. 
Additionally, as discussed above, most of the studies likely do not meet 
the requirements permitting waiver or alteration of informed consent. 
Consequently, it seems highly likely that the researchers created and had 
players sign consent forms that included the information required by the 
Common Rule. Only six studies mention having obtained consent from the 
participants.150 However, even among these studies, the sufficiency of the 
consent is unclear. Two studies rely on consent forms executed by the 
players for purposes of being evaluated at the Combine, but not for the 
research specifically.151 Additionally, two of the studies state that “[a]ll 
players signed a consent form allowing use of their data by teams for the 
annual Draft and also for research purposes.”152 
In fact, as discussed earlier, Combine participants execute broad 
waivers concerning the use of their medical information.153 One of the 
waivers provides that the player is authorizing the disclosure of his 
medical records for purposes relating to, among other things, “NFL player 
health and safety initiatives and projects, in accordance with the August 4, 
2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement and amendments to it, including 
 
 149. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2). 
 150. See infra Appendix A, studies 3, 22, 24–25, 31, 40. 
 151. See Lee D. Kaplan et al., Incidence and Variance of Foot and Ankle Injuries in 
Elite College Football Players, 40 AM. J. ORTHOPEDICS 40, 41 (2011) (“All players 
attended [the 2006 Combine] voluntarily and provided written consent to be evaluated.”); 
Lee D. Kaplan et al., Prevalence and Variance of Shoulder Injuries in Elite Collegiate 
Football Players, 33 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 1142, 1143 (2005) (“All players attended [the 
2004 Combine] voluntarily and signed waivers for their evaluation.”). 
 152. See John E. Zvijac et al., Isokinetic Concentric Quadriceps and Hamstring 
Normative Data for Elite Collegiate American Football Players Participating in the NFL 
Scouting Combine, 28 J. STRENGTH & CONDITIONING RES. 875, 877 (2014); John E. Zvijac 
et al., Isokinetic Concentric Quadriceps and Hamstring Strength Variables From the NFL 
Scouting Combine Are Not Predictive of Hamstring Injury in First-Year Professional 
Football Players, 41 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 1511, 1512 (2013). 
 153. See supra notes 112 and accompanying text. 
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without limitation the Side Letter Agreement regarding the Injury 
Surveillance System and Player Health Information Analysis, 
Dissemination and Research, dated December 2014 . . . .”154 This 
provision suggests that there is an agreement between the NFL and 
NFLPA about the use of Combine participant medical information, and 
that that agreement permits the information to be used for research 
purposes. Neither the NFL nor NFLPA responded to my requests for a 
copy of this side letter. All the same, as discussed above, the NFLPA 
cannot negotiate on behalf of Combine participants. Thus, the 
enforceability of any such agreement as it applies to Combine participants 
is dubious. 
Additionally, these waivers are terribly vague. The waivers do not 
provide any of the numerous pieces of information required of the 
Common Rule,155 including but not limited to “an explanation of the 
purposes of the research,” “[a] description of any reasonably foreseeable 
risks or discomforts,” or “[a] statement that participation is voluntary.”156 
More broadly, as required by the newer version of the Common Rule, no 
reasonable person could argue that the waiver provides “[t]he prospective 
subject . . . with the information that a reasonable person would want to 
have in order to make an informed decision about whether to participate, 
and an opportunity to discuss that information.”157 Simply put, these 
waivers do not provide the meaningful informed consent required by the 
Common Rule. 
Importantly, the waivers would not have to provide the information 
described above if the research were secondary research exempt from the 
Common Rule. However, for reasons discussed above in Section III.C, 
that does not appear to be the case for many studies. 
In the absence of a universal waiver that the NFL, its clubs and their 
doctors have tried to impose upon Combine participants, it seems very 
unlikely that players would carefully read and consider consent forms 
from multiple studies. For example, 17 of the studies utilize data from the 
2015 NFL Combine. It is difficult to imagine that a 2015 NFL Combine 
participant carefully reviewed 17 different consent forms in addition to the 
various other documents and pieces of information presented to them at 
the Combine. 
At this point, pausing and looking forward is useful. Above is an 
explanation of why the existing NFL Combine waivers were likely not 
sufficient to establish informed consent under the Common Rule. 
 
 154. See Roberts et al., supra note 108, online app. C. 
 155. See supra notes 147 and accompanying text. 
 156. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b) (West 2018). 
 157. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(4). 
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Nevertheless, the revised Common Rule likely makes things easier for the 
NFL, its clubs and related researchers. As discussed in Section I.C.1, the 
revised Common Rule codifies a “broad consent” process through which 
a research subject can consent to the data, information or biospecimens 
gathered as part of an initial study to be used in a subsequent study 
provided the data, information or biospecimens are de-identified. The 
studies discussed herein all rely on the same principal data source—the 
NFL Combine database. Moreover, there is considerable overlap in the co-
authors. Thus, a future in which researchers could obtain consent for one 
study and then thereafter fairly easily conduct other studies with de-
identified data is possible. 
Nevertheless, until players provide informed consent to even one 
study, it is debatable whether NFL Combine participants have previously 
executed the waivers provided to them free of coercion or undue influence. 
As discussed above, the definitions of coercion and undue influence are 
slightly amorphous among the bioethical and legal literature.158 
Nevertheless, the literature identifies as troubling circumstances where the 
research subject faces a “worse consequence,” “unfair persuasion,” or 
“economic force[s]” that compel the subject’s participation.159 Moreover, 
OHRP identified an “implicit” threat of harm as being coercive.160 
NFL Combine participants have a significantly constrained choice 
about whether to participate in much of the research being conducted. As 
discussed above, the NFL Combine is generally considered the “biggest 
job interview” of these young men’s lives.161  Approximately 300 players 
attend the NFL Combine,162 competing amongst each other and with 
players not invited to the Combine for approximately 255 spots in the NFL 
Draft. 
The medical exams conducted at the Combine—and which are the 
empirical basis for the research discussed in this Article—provide a useful 
comparator. As discussed above, the medical examinations, according to 
the clubs, are crucial to their evaluation of players.163 According to Jeff 
Foster, President of the organization that hosts the NFL Combine, skipping 
a medical test could serve as “red flag” to NFL clubs “and would not be 
good for the player.”164 Indeed, Foster explained that “‘if you’re not going 
to participate [in the medical exams], there’s no reason to be’” at the 
 
 158. See supra note 72-79 and accompanying text. 
 159. See id.  
 160. Informed Consent FAQs, supra note 67. 
 161. See Bhanpuri et al., supra note 96. 
 162. Roberts et al., supra note 108, at 235. 
 163. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 164. Rick Maese, The NFL Combine: Pro football’s intrusive and compulsory, job 
interview, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2017), https://wapo.st/2Pb7By3. 
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Combine.165 Given the pressure to impress clubs, there can be no doubt 
that NFL Combine participants are reluctant to do anything that might 
negatively affect their hopes of being drafted and having a career in the 
NFL. There is certainly a strong “implicit” threat that if a player does not 
cooperate, he will suffer adverse employment consequences. 
Consequently, it seems very unlikely that any player has refused to 
participate in the medical exams. 
Combine participants likely feel similar pressure to consent to 
medical research. The request for cooperation is coming from the same 
source—NFL club medical personnel. While the club medical personnel 
are likely more interested in the player’s medical examination than his 
consent to participate in research, there is little difference to the player—
they do not want to disappoint or anger an NFL club. 
Given the pressures involved, it seems very unlikely that a player 
would not sign whatever consent or waiver form presented to them at the 
Combine—whether for a medical exam or for research. In this respect, the 
waivers are contracts of adhesion—a “standard-form contract prepared by 
one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position.”166 Via 
email, I asked Foster whether, to his knowledge, any NFL Combine 
participant had ever refused to sign a waiver requested of him;167 he did 
not respond. 
Moreover, bioethics experts have questioned the voluntariness of 
health waivers used by professional sports organizations. Kartina Karkazis 
and Jennifer R. Fishman argued that athletes are effectively “coerc[ed]” 
into executing such waivers “because of concerns about keeping a job, 
renewing a contract, or simply getting playing time.”168 Similarly, Mark 
A. Rothstein argues that such “waivers are unethical,” because 
“[i]ndividual players have no choice but to sign a waiver, and thus they 
are inherently coercive.”169 While these comments were not addressed 
specifically at the waiver or consent forms used for the research studies, 
as discussed above, the contexts are substantially similar. 
OHRP has specifically recognized that “when employees are the 
subjects of research”: 
investigators and IRBs must be cautious about the potential for 
coercion and undue influence and the need to protect confidentiality. 
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Employee participation raises questions about the ability of employees 
to exercise free choice, for example, because of the possibility that a 
decision to participate could affect performance evaluations or job 
advancement, even if it is only the employee’s perception that this is 
the case . . . . Employees are likely to view their employers as authority 
figures to whom they must show deference, which could undermine 
the freedom of their choice.170  
Although Combine participants are not yet employees of NFL clubs, 
the same concerns exist. Indeed, the fact that they are not yet employees 
heightens the concerns of coercion and undue influence, since the 
Combine participants are seeking a job they do not yet have. 
In another analogous setting, OHRP recognizes the risks of coercion 
or undue influence “when students are involved in research in a college or 
university setting.”171 OHRP “recommends that institutions have policies 
in place that clarify for students and faculty that any participation of 
students in research must be voluntary.”172 Moreover, according to OHRP, 
“some research institutions use a so-called ‘student subject pool’ to 
identify students who might be willing to participate in research, even 
when the exact nature of the research to be conducted has not yet been 
determined.”173 Importantly, “[s]tudents who sign up for such pools have 
not legally consented to participate in a research study since they have not 
been provided with sufficient information concerning the exact study in 
which they would participate.”174 Student subject pools thus bear 
considerable resemblance to NFL Combine participants. In both cases, the 
research participants have positioned themselves to potentially be included 
in a research study. Nevertheless, informed consent cannot be obtained 
until they are provided with the appropriate information concerning the 
exact study in which they might participate.175 
Lastly, the consent process is all the more suspect given the strong 
argument that NFL Combine participants should be considered vulnerable 
research subjects, a possibility discussed next. 
G. Should NFL Combine Participants Be Considered a 
Vulnerable Population? 
As mentioned earlier in Section III.C.1, the Common Rule requires 
that “[w]hen some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to 
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coercion or undue influence, such as children, prisoners, individuals with 
impaired decision-making capacity, or economically or educationally 
disadvantaged persons, additional safeguards [must be] included in the 
study to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects.”176 
NFL Combine participants are clearly not explicitly identified in that 
list. Nevertheless, the “[t]he words ‘such as’ suggest that these groups are 
simply examples of vulnerable populations, rather than an exhaustive 
list.”177 Academics in the field have recognized that “vulnerability is an 
elusive concept,”178 but one that should be given “the most expansive 
construction.”179 
Various expert organizations have proffered guidelines to help assess 
whether a population is vulnerable within the context of human subjects 
research. The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
(CIOMS) identified vulnerable persons “a[s] those who are relatively (or 
absolutely) incapable of protecting their own interests. More formally, 
they may have insufficient power, intelligence, education, resources, 
strength, or other needed attributes to protect their own interests.”180 
CIOMS further explained that “[t]he quality of the consent of prospective 
subjects who are junior or subordinate members of a hierarchal group 
requires careful consideration, as their agreement to volunteer may be 
unduly influenced . . . by the expectation of preferential treatment if they 
agree or by fear of disapproval or retaliation if they refuse.”181 The 
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, an advisory 
panel within the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, defines 
vulnerability in substantially the same way.182 
Without examining all of the factors that might be considered in 
determining whether a population should be considered vulnerable, this 
Section focuses on two factors that support the position that NFL Combine 
participants should be considered vulnerable for purposes of human 
subjects research: (1) Combine participants’ economic status; and (2) an 
inequity in power between a player-participant and NFL clubs. In closing, 
this Section analogizes the situation of NFL Combine participants with 
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another population generally considered to be vulnerable for purposes of 
human subjects research—military service members. 
It is well recognized that lower income individuals should generally 
be considered a vulnerable population for human subjects research.183 
“Individuals with limited resources might be vulnerable to exploitation in 
clinical research if researchers take advantage of their poor socioeconomic 
circumstances by offering unfair benefits in relation to the burdens of a 
study, or if individuals perceive that they have no choice but to 
participate.”184 Such situations create the risk that the study participant is 
being taken advantage of, or being used merely as a “means for the ends 
of others.”185 While NFL Combine participants might one day make 
millions of dollars, at the time of the Combine they have not yet made a 
single dollar from playing football (provided they abided by NCAA rules). 
Research has found that “over one-half” of black Division I college 
football players come from low socioeconomic backgrounds,186 and from 
hometowns that are more “socioeconomically disadvantaged” than the 
national average.187 There is also considerable research about the 
importance of a career in sports for black men, for whom fewer resources 
and opportunities limit their upward mobility.188 With this background, it 
is clear that a significant portion of NFL Combine participants189 will feel 
pressure to comply with the requests of NFL club and Combine personnel, 
or risk losing a tremendous opportunity for a lucrative career. 
The limited financial resources and opportunities for many NFL 
Combine participants leads to the next consideration in finding the 
population to be vulnerable: the inequity in power between the player-
participants and NFL clubs. While the above medical studies may lead to 
better treatment methods for NFL players in the future, they are also 
largely devoted to player evaluation on behalf of NFL clubs. The doctors 
performing the Combine medical exams—and publishing the studies—are 
doing so principally to help NFL clubs, not players. As discussed above, 
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24 of the studies compared players’ Combine medical records against their 
performance or longevity in the NFL.190 Moreover, as discussed above in 
Section III.E, NFL Combine participants are extremely unlikely to resist 
research requests, for fear of irritating the NFL clubs that want the research 
data. Such situations present a problem of “deferential vulnerability,” 
where prospective participants “have the cognitive capacity to consent but 
are subject to the authority of others who might have independent interests 
in whether the prospective participant agrees to enroll in the research 
study.”191 As a result, there can be problematic and “inequitable 
distributions of the burdens and benefits of research.”192 
This inequity in power leads to a final consideration in evaluating 
NFL Combine participants as a vulnerable research population—their 
similarity to military service members. Professor Efthimios Parasidis of 
The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law has persuasively made 
the case that service members should be considered a vulnerable research 
population.193 Professor Parasidis’s argument is based on six factors: (1) a 
military command structure in which a subordinate officer must obey a 
lawful order of a superior officer; (2) a nebulous boundary between 
treatment and research in military settings; (3) liberal use of waivers 
waiving informed consent; (4) a military culture which stresses 
conformity; (5) the priority of the health of the group over that of the 
individual; and (6) governmental immunities and limitations on tort claims 
by military personnel.194 All of these factors—except the sixth—are also 
present in the NFL workplace (including at the NFL Combine), as will be 
elaborated on below. 
There is a long history of players, coaches, fans, media and others 
analogizing the physical and strategic nature of football with that of war.195 
A list of famous quotes from legendary coach Vince Lombardi repeatedly 
mentions “battle” and “war.”196 These comparisons have rightly drawn 
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criticism197—as the playing of a sport for considerable economic gain 
should not rightfully be likened to facing life and death situations in 
service of your country. Nevertheless, there are substantial similarities 
between the cultures relevant to the vulnerability analysis. 
The Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues aptly 
summarized the challenging environment in the military: 
Military personnel also might feel pressure to participate in research 
because of the structured hierarchy in which they live and work. They 
might feel that participation could contribute to promotions, easier 
assignments, or special privileges; or that refusal to participate could 
result in demotions or other punitive measures. Moreover, the success 
of military operations depends in part on giving up some individual 
autonomy for the good of the whole; for this reason, soldiers might be 
coerced to participate in research if it is considered to be for the greater 
good; for example, accepting an experimental vaccine to ensure that 
the entire force would be protected.198  
Now consider the below description of the NFL workplace by former 
NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue, while serving as an arbitrator in a 
2012 case in which New Orleans Saints players199 faced potential 
discipline for allegedly participating in a program created by coaches that 
offered financial rewards for big plays and injuries to opponents: 
In determining player discipline for involvement in performance pools 
- - whatever form they may take - - that are developed, encouraged and 
managed by coaches, the coach-player relationship is also material. 
NFL players on average have short careers; their careers can end 
suddenly through injury or declining skills; players want to be good, 
cohesive members of the team, or unit, not complainers or dissenters; 
and players accept that they work for coaches, in “programs” 
conceived by coaches. . . . 
In such circumstances, players may not have much choice but to “go 
along,” to comply with coaching demands or directions that they may 
question or resent. They may know - - or believe - - that from the 
coaches’ perspective, “it’s my way or the highway.” Coaching legends 
such as George Halas and Vince Lombardi are not glorified or 
remembered because they offered players “freedom of choice.” 
While more recent and current coaches may debate whether and how 
much coaching approaches to “do it my way” have changed over time, 
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it is clear that directions such as those given by the Saints’ coaches in 
creating the Program are usually followed by most players. NFL head 
coaches told me in my seventeen years as Commissioner, “If players 
don’t do it our way, they can find another team to pay them.”200 
The similarities are considerable. In both the military and the NFL, 
the personnel are under tremendous pressure to obey the orders of their 
superiors and sacrifice themselves for the betterment of the organization. 
If they fail to do so, they will suffer serious consequences. Admittedly, the 
consequences at stake are disparate. In the NFL, a player’s non-
compliance could result in the loss of his job or career. In the military, 
non-compliance can lead to court martial and imprisonment.201 Without 
diminishing the pressures faced by military members, I nonetheless 
believe the culture of the NFL is sufficiently similar to learn from special 
considerations that may be given to military members. 
Returning to the factors outlined by Professor Parasidis in support of 
categorizing military personnel as vulnerable, the above descriptions 
demonstrate the similarity between the NFL and the military as to three of 
them: the command structure; a culture of conformity; and the priority of 
the health of the group over that of the individual. 
A fourth factor identified by Professor Parasidis is also relevant in 
the NFL context—a nebulous boundary between treatment and research. 
Club doctors are hired, paid, and reviewed by the clubs.202 The doctors 
then examine players for, at least in part, the purpose of providing the club 
with information concerning the health status of players for both short-
term and long-term purposes.203 At the same time, club doctors are 
obligated by the CBA and codes of ethics to provide medical care that 
prioritizes the players’ interests.204 The club doctors’ dual roles is a 
structural conflict of interest that can cause confusion and concern.205 
While these characteristics describe the situation for players already in the 
NFL—as opposed to those at the NFL Combine—the environment is still 
very similar. The purposes of the medical exams at the NFL Combine 
might not always be clear to the players. On the one hand, the doctor might 
examine the player and make a diagnosis meaningful to the player’s 
health. On the other hand, the doctor is also making note of any medical 
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concerns that might affect the player’s usefulness to NFL clubs. Such an 
environment blurs the boundaries between medical care and analysis or 
research for other purposes. 
Lastly, Professor Parasidis identified the liberal use of waivers as 
supporting a finding of vulnerability. As explained above, NFL Combine 
participants execute broad waivers permitting their medical information to 
be shared with the NFL, NFL clubs and related parties.206 This process is 
repeated once players are in the NFL and, according to one current player, 
no one refuses to sign the waivers: “it’s you sign this and you play football 
or you don’t sign it and you don’t, everybody signs it. I don’t know 
anybody who hasn’t.”207 
In sum, NFL Combine participants are strongly deserving of 
consideration as a vulnerable population for human subjects research in 
light of their socioeconomic demographics and the disparity in power 
between themselves and those supporting and conducting the research. 
Finally, the considerable similarities between Combine participants and 
military personnel—a population often considered vulnerable for research 
purposes—further supports a finding that Combine participants merit 
additional protections and considerations when subjects of research. 
 
*** 
 
With the above understanding of how the Common Rule applies to 
research conducted on NFL Combine participants, and how at times such 
research might not comply with the Common Rule, in Part IV I discuss 
ways in which NFL players can be better protected when they are human 
subjects research participants. 
V. PROTECTING NFL COMBINE PARTICIPANTS MOVING 
FORWARD 
Above, a number of uncertainties concerning the potential 
application of the Common Rule to the studies discussed herein are 
highlighted. It is possible that many (if not most) of the studies complied 
with the Common Rule or perhaps were even exempt in various ways. 
Nevertheless, from what is known, there are still ethical concerns related 
to research involving NFL Combine participants, particularly concerning 
the informed consent process. 
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Protecting future NFL Combine participants in the context of medical 
research might be achieved in two ways: (1) seeking to enforce the 
participants’ existing rights; and (2) improving the process through which 
players consent to and participate in such research. 
A. Players’ Enforcement Options 
Unfortunately, players who might believe that they participated in 
research that did not comply with the Common Rule do not have 
meaningful recourse. First, the Common Rule does not create a private 
cause of action, meaning human subjects research participants cannot sue 
to enforce the Common Rule or obtain damages for a party’s failure to 
comply with it.208 Second, while research participants can report potential 
violations of the Common Rule to OHRP,209 OHRP has no authority to 
compensate the participant for any harm suffered,210 particularly now that 
it no longer has authority over institutions “checking the box.” With a lack 
of meaningful enforcement options, it is all that more important that the 
process of using Combine participants of human subjects research comply 
with both the letter and spirit of the Common Rule. The next Section 
recommends solutions to reach this outcome. 
B. Recommendations for An Improved Process 
There have been a variety of protections implemented and 
recommended for certain vulnerable groups. The Common Rule includes 
specific “additional protections” for human fetuses, and neonates,211 as 
well as for prisoners212 and children.213 The additional protections for 
human fetuses, neonates and children are medically-driven; aimed to 
protect the health of the subjects.214 The additional protections for 
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prisoners exist out of concern that prisoners’ “incarceration . . . could 
affect their ability to make a truly voluntary and uncoerced decision 
whether or not to participate as subjects in research.”215 
Otherwise, various bioethics committees have suggested a variety of 
protections for vulnerable groups, including but not limited to selecting 
participants less burdened by their circumstances, ensuring that the 
research is responsive to the health needs of the population, obtaining 
permission from appropriate representatives, assessing the vulnerability of 
the population, and additional oversight by the IRB.216 
Drawing from the Common Rule protections, others proposed for 
vulnerable populations, and other safeguards occasionally required by 
IRBs, there are a variety of ways in which human subjects research 
utilizing NFL Combine participants can be done in a more fair and 
appropriate manner. 
First, the researchers and/or the Combine participants could be 
required to read the consent form aloud and audio record the process. A 
process whereby the subjects have more time to think about the research 
rather than quickly scribbling their signature on a consent form would 
certainly enhance the subjects’ decision-making power. The audio 
recording merely ensures the process was completed properly. This is not 
an uncommon practice and thus it is certainly possible some of the studies 
discussed herein went through such a process. 
Second, the NFLPA could insist upon the right to approve any 
research utilizing NFL Combine participants. In fact, two studies reference 
having obtained NFLPA approval.217 There is additional precedent for this 
recommendation. The CBA prohibits NFL clubs from utilizing wearable 
technologies worn by players “for health or medical purposes” without the 
NFLPA’s consent.218 Similarly, the Accountability and Care Committee, 
jointly staffed by the NFL and NFLPA, is charged with “conduct[ing] 
research into prevention and treatment of illness and injury commonly 
experienced by professional athletes,” and “conduct[ing] a confidential 
player survey at least once every two years to solicit the players’ input and 
opinion regarding the adequacy of medical care provided by their 
respective medical and training staffs.”219 As explained above, the 
NFLPA’s negotiation of the medical authorization forms for Combine 
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participants is without legal effect since the participants are not yet within 
the bargaining unit represented by the NFLPA.220 This fact raises 
questions about the propriety of the NFLPA screening research conducted 
on NFL Combine participants. The crucial distinction is that in negotiating 
the waivers, the NFLPA is seemingly purporting to act as a representative 
of the players concerning their legal rights, i.e., negotiating the disclosure 
and use of player medical records. Screening research does not go that far. 
The NFLPA can review and assess research studies without affecting 
players’ legal rights. The NFLPA is a stakeholder on this issue and has 
valuable expertise that it should exercise in support of its future members. 
Third, as a proxy for the oversight provided by the NFLPA, the 
consent process could require that the consent form be provided to the 
Combine participants’ agent. By virtue of the National Labor Relations 
Act, agents—formally known as “contract advisors”—are agents of the 
NFLPA for the purposes of representing players in matters concerning 
their employment.221 Rather than represent all players by itself, the 
NFLPA certifies and regulates contract advisors for the purposes of 
protecting and assisting NFL players.222 Thus, reviewing a consent form 
for a player is within the scope of a contract advisor’s duties. Moreover, 
providing the consent form to a professional who has a fiduciary obligation 
to look out for the player’s best interests will help ensure that the player’s 
rights and interests are being protected.223 
Fourth, in reviewing research involving NFL Combine participants, 
IRBs could seek out the perspective of a player, former player, or someone 
sufficiently representative of their perspective. Indeed, in research 
involving prisoners, “[a]t least one member of the [Institutional Review] 
Board shall be a prisoner, or a prisoner representative with appropriate 
background and experience to serve in that capacity.”224 Given the 
unfortunate fact that there are far less current and former NFL players than 
there are current or former prisoners, the IRB need not necessarily include 
such an individual as a Board member. But at a minimum, the IRB should 
seek out their perspective on how the research—including the consent 
process—might be received by or affect the player population. To 
facilitate this, it might be advisable to take advantage of a change in the 
Common Rule that now permits a single IRB to review research being 
conducted at multiple sites and institutions.225 A single IRB might be able 
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to develop the necessary expertise—while taking into account the various 
concerns discussed herein—to ensure the research is conducted 
appropriately and effectively. 
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, the IRB should require that the 
Combine participants’ decision whether or not to participate in the medical 
research remain confidential. It is of course common for the identity of 
research subjects to remain confidential. However, the risks of disclosure 
are particularly serious here where a player could suffer serious adverse 
employment action as a result of his refusal to participate in a research 
study. That risk is compounded by the fact that the research studies are 
being conducted by doctors and athletic trainers affiliated with NFL clubs. 
Those doctors and athletic trainers provide advice to clubs about potential 
draftees. If those doctors or athletic trainers have a negative experience 
with the player as a result of a player’s refusal to participate in a research 
study, that could negatively affect the doctor or athletic trainer’s opinion 
of the player and thus also the player’s Draft status. Appropriate 
safeguards and firewalls are necessary to ensure that the NFL and NFL 
clubs cannot learn the identities of players who refused to participate in 
medical research requested of them. For example, it would likely be best 
that medical personnel affiliated with the NFL or an NFL club not be 
involved in any way in the consent process and only review de-identified 
research data. 
These recommendations do not suggest that federal regulations 
concerning the NFL Combine are needed. Rather, these are 
recommendations best considered by the IRBs overseeing studies with 
NFL Combine participants as subjects. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Medical personnel for NFL clubs are often leading experts in their 
field. Nevertheless, they also work in an environment in which their 
loyalties and duties are divided between players and the clubs. The 
medical studies discussed in this Article are further evidence of this 
conflict. These research studies, which were overwhelmingly run by NFL 
club medical personnel, generally analyze NFL Combine participant 
medical information for the principal purpose of being able to better 
evaluate the usefulness of those players to NFL clubs. In the process, the 
players’ rights and interests are subordinated. This is unacceptable. Given 
that the structure of NFL club medical staffs is unlikely to change anytime 
soon,226 other options and authorities must be considered in protecting 
 
 226. See Letter from Jeffrey A. Miller, Executive Vice President of Health & Safety 
Initiatives, NFL, to Christopher R. Deubert, I. Glenn Cohen, & Holly Fernandez Lynch 
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players. In this specific context, IRBs have the potential to ensure that NFL 
Combine participants are being subjected to research in the dignified and 
respectful matter required by the Common Rule. 
  
 
10–14 (Nov. 1, 2016), https://bit.ly/2RneYzj (denying conflict of interest in structure of 
NFL club medical care). 
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